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COMMENT

UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE CORPORATE SETTING
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,1 the Supreme Court took
a significant step toward resolving the confusion which has
surrounded the application of the attorney-client privilege in
the corporate setting. The Court emphatically rejected the
"control group" test which had been followed by the Third,2
Sixths and Tenth 4 Circuits. And while it did not specifically
adopt the "subject matter" test in either its Seventh 5 or
Eighth" Circuit formulations, the Court appeared to rely on
the Eighth Circuit's modified approach in resolving the matter
before it. Thus, the high court has provided a model for the
circuits without locking them into a rigid "test."7 Such flexibility affords the federal courts the opportunity to tie the application of the attorney-client privilege to its underlying purpose. This comment will examine that purpose, the conflicting
case law that led to the Upjohn decision, the decision itself
and its implications for the future.
I.

THE PRIVILEGE AND ITS PURPOSE

Confidential attorney-client communications have been
protected from forced disclosure since 1577.8 The original jus1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
2. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
3. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
4. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
5. Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afrd mem.
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
6. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978)(en banc).
7. The following circuits have relied on Upjohn: In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Permian Corp. v. United States, [current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,280 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1981). However, the Illinois
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to the control group test in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., No. 54752 (IlM.Feb. 2, 1982).
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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tification for such protection was the preservation of the attorney's oath and honor.' However, this theory fell into disrepute in the late eighteenth century, and was gradually
replaced by the rationale that such protection was necessary
to dispel the client's apprehensions of disclosure 0 and thereby
to promote fully informed and effective legal counsel. 1 Implicit in this rationale is the belief that the benefits to society
of full legal representation outweigh the detriment to the op-2
posing party which results from withholding information.
However, because "[i]ts benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction. . . plain and concrete,"' 3 Wigmore states
that the privilege should be strictly construed. 1 4 Such a construction comports with the modern trend toward liberal discovery. 5 It also has a certain logical appeal since, unlike the
work-product immunity doctrine which can be defeated upon

9. Id. at 543.
10. Id.
11. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 175 (2d ed. 1972).
Dean McCormick suggests a further reason for the continued vitality of the privilege:
A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the relationship, and this sentiment
would be outraged by an attempt to change our customs so as to make the
lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the client's confidential disclosures regarding professional business. Loyalty and sentiment are silken
threads, but they are hard to break.
Id. at 176.
12. Id. at 175; Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor CorporateClients: The Control
Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 424, 425 (1970).
The Supreme Court in Upjohn stated it as follows:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy
depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client.
449 U.S. at 389.
13. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2291, at 554. As one commentator has noted
there are two unverifiable assumptions: "first, that the existence of the privilege encourages communications between attorney and client that might be inhibited in its
absence; and second, that the social benefit of encouraging this type of communication exceeds the harm of thwarting full disclosure in subsequent litigation." Kobak,
The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
The only empirical study as to the first assumption appears inconclusive. See
Note, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2291, at 554.
15. "Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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a showing of substantial need and undue hardship,1 6 the privi17
lege, once it is found to apply, is absolute.
Because of the conflicting policy considerations, the privilege attaches only when all the essential elements are present.
Wigmore provides the following definition:
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.'
While the application of this definition can be relatively
straightforward in the case of an individual client, it can become quite uncertain when applied to a corporation. For example, in-house counsel may act as a businessman as well as
an attorney. When is the advice protected as "legal?" And
what of confidentiality when a low level employee reports certain conduct to the corporate attorney who in turn informs
company executives? And, most significantly, who speaks for
the corporate client - only members of the board of directors? - middle management as well? - any employee? An
examination of the cases leading to Upjohn will demonstrate
the varied ways in which the federal courts have responded to
these questions and how their answers have related to the

16. [A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. Consistent with the court's desire to strictly construe the privilege, two exceptions to the protections of the privilege have been recognized. First, communications
intended to further a crime or fraud, regardless of whether the attorney is aware of
the client's ill-purpose, are not protected. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d
1347 (9th Cir. 1977). Second, where an attorney had previously represented subsequently opposing parties on a matter of common or mutual interest, the prior communications between the attorney and the party or parties are admissible in the
subsequent controversy. See Stover & Koesterer, Attorney-Client Privilege in Wisconsin, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 227, 234 (1976); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4TH 765 (1981).
18. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2292, at 554.
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promotion of candor be-

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

Until 1962, the application of the attorney-client privilege
to corporations was simply assumed by the federal courts.19 In
that year, however, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Association,20 held that a corporation was not entitled to
claim the privilege.2 The court recognized that no court had
previously decided the issue. Notwithstanding prior judicial
silence, the court set forth two arguments for its unique holding. First, the court reasoned that the privilege is historically
and fundamentally personal in nature and so could only be
claimed by natural persons, in the same way that the fifth
amendment guarantee against self-incrimination is personal. 2
Second, Judge Campbell believed that it would be impossible
to maintain the confidentiality of the communications (without which the privilege is lost) within a corporation where
many individuals have access to records and files.2 3 In addition, assuming that employees and shareholders as well as
board members and officers would be covered by the privilege,
he expressed a fear that the "zone of silence ' 24 (the corporation's activities which would be insulated from discovery by
funneling information through the corporate attorney) could

19. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & N.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
20. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.
1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).
21. Id. at 773.
22. Id. See also Gardner, A PersonalPrivilegefor Communications of Corporate
Clients - Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DEr. L.J. 299 (1963).
23. 207 F. Supp. at 773-75.
24. Where corporations are involved, with their large number of agents, masses
of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows
large. Few judges - or legislators either, for that matter - would long tolerate
any common law privilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them with legal advisers.
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privlege As Applied to Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 953,
955-56 (1956). The term "zone of silence" which appears with some frequency in the
cases dealing with corporate attorney-client privilege was apparently coined by Simon
in this article.
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grow quite large.25
Radiant Burners was reversed on appeal.26 The appeals
court held that the privilege existed to facilitate the workings
of justice regardless of whether the client is a corporation or
an individual.2 7 Further, the court held that the question of
confidentiality will vary depending upon the size and structure of the corporation and thus each case had to be examined
on a case-by-case basis.28
After Radiant Burners II no one questioned whether a
corporation could claim the privilege; however, the questions
which the district court raised concerning the scope of the
privilege remained. Prior to the Radiant Burners decisions,
the applicable standard had been set forth in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.29 The court held that the privilege extended to "information furnished [to the attorney] by
an officer or employee of the defendant [corporation] in confidence and without the presence of third persons."30 While the
court offered no explanation of why it extended such broad
coverage, the argument can be made that the structure of the
corporation itself dictates extensive protection if full disclosure is to be encouraged. Further, if all employees are included, there is a predictability in the application of the privilege which further encourages frank communication with

25. 207 F. Supp. at 774-75.
26. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. IM. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
27. Id. at 322.
28. Id. at 323-24.
29. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). Accord Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski formulated an oft-quoted definition of the
privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
30. Id. at 359.
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counsel.31
However, as Judge Campbell pointed out in Radiant
Burners I, this broad approach is susceptible to the criticism
of creating too broad a "zone of silence. '3 2 In addition, the
United Shoe test appears to contradict the Supreme Court's
3 That case, best known for its
dictum in Hickman v. Taylor.
enunciation of the work-product immunity doctrine, arose out
of an accident in which a tug boat, owned by a partnership,
capsized, killing several of the crew members. The partnership
retained counsel who interviewed the surviving crew members,
who were employees of the partnership, in anticipation of impending litigation. Although the Court held that the memoranda which summarized the interviews were protected by
work-product immunity, it noted that the documents were not
covered by the attorney-client privilege. "[T]he protective
cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client
in anticipation of litigation. 3 4 Since the witnesses here were
employees, the Court seemed to say'that not every communication from an employee will be privileged. Whether the
Hickman Court would have limited the privilege in this case
to the partners only or whether it withheld the privilege from
employees because of their unique function as witnessess is
unclear. In any case, the district court opinion in Radiant
Burners set the stage for a reevaluation of the broad coverage
the privilege afforded corporations. Two divergent lines of
cases emerged, one espousing a narrow approach which has
become known as the "control group" test and the other
steering a middle path which is known as the "subject matter"
test.
A.

The Control Group Test

City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Electric Corp.35 was

31. Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested
Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360, 369-70 (1970); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04], at 44-45 (1980).
32. See supra note 24.
33. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
34. Id. at 508.
35. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohib. denied sub nom., General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943
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the seminal case in the formulation of the control group approach. Before turning to the central issue of the case whether lower level employees' communications with the corporation's attorney are protected by the privilege - the court
disposed of a preliminary issue worthy of note. The privilege
was asserted on behalf of the individual employee involved as
well as on behalf of the corporation. 6 The court summarily
disposed of this claim because the attorney told the employee
that if his disclosures constituted violations of company policy, they would be reported to company management. 7
Clearly, the required confidentiality did not exist between the
attorney and the individual (as opposed to the corporate) client and, therefore, no privilege attached. That it is the corporation and not the employee who may claim and also waive
the privilege becomes significant in later cases which argue
against the subject matter test.3 8
The court then focused its inquiry on whether the corporation was seeking legal advice at the time that the challenged
communication was made. It found that, if an employee was
merely providing information so that the lawyer could later
advise the client corporation, the employee was a mere witness and not privileged according to Hickman.3 9 In determining whether the person making the communication was a client or a witness, the court rejected both rank and ability to
incur liability on behalf of the corporation as criteria. 40 Instead, it formulated the following test:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if
he is an authorized member of a body or group which has
that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes
his disclosure to the lawyer and the
4
privilege would apply. '

(1963).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 484.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979).
210 F. Supp. at 485.
Id.
Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:241

In very general terms, this test limited the privilege to a control group such as the board of directors and chief officers
while excluding middle management and lower level
employees.
Proponents of the test cite two primary justifications for
such a restriction. First, it alleviates what might otherwise be
an inordinate burden on discovery. 42 Unlike information
about an individual client, which is readily available from a
single source, information about a corporation must be gathered from a potentially large number of employees who may
be widely scattered geographically. The litigant's burden is
greatly reduced if much of the necessary information has already been conveyed to the corporate attorney and such communications are not sheltered by the attorney-client privilege.
In fact, this may be the litigant's only source of information if
a particular employee can no longer recall the specific information that is needed or has died. In addition, if no privilege
exists between the attorney and lower level employees who
lack decision making ability on legal matters, there is no
temptation to funnel routine documents through counsel in
hopes of protecting them from discovery.
Second, in many cases information is provided to the attorney for mixed business and legal reasons and would have to
be directed to his office even in the absence of any privilege.4 9
Thus, affording the privilege to the communication may not
provide any inducement to communicate. In addition, confidentiality is far more difficult to maintain within a corporation than between an individual client and his attorney. To
say that secrecy is intended when the communication is made
simply may not be true, particularly for the lower level employee. He is probably well aware that information may pass
through many hands before it reaches the attorney and that
other employees may later have access to files in which it is
stored.4 4 More fundamental, perhaps, is whether the lower
level employee is actually motivated by the premise that information he discloses to the attorney will be sheltered from
42. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 427; Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58
TEx. L. REv. 809, 825 (1980).
43. See Note, supra note 12, at 428.
44. Id. at 427-28.
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sources outside the corporation. If he has a limited appreciation of the overall workings of the corporation, he may not
know what information is detrimental and what beneficial. 5
Even if he does know, this may be of no particular concern to
him because his interests are not as closely tied to the corporation's as are those of the control group members. 46 In fact, a
lower level employee's primary motivation for providing information to the attorney is probably his superior's directive.
Any apprehension he may feel at revealing information likely
to displease his superiors is in no way alleviated by the existence of the privilege. Therefore, the privilege can scarcely be
said to be an inducement to communication outside the control group.
Although a substantial number of the federal courts
adopted the control group test,4" it has been attacked on sev-

eral fronts. First, critics denounce the test for failing to recognize the obvious difference between the individual and the
corporate client. While the former can both provide the attorney with information and act on his advice, the latter must
often rely on one group of individuals to be the information °
givers and another group to be the decision makers. Thus,
under the control group test, the attorney is confronted with a
"Hobson's choice." If he refrains from interviewing lower level
employees with relevant information for fear that these com-

45. Id. at 428-29.
46. It is the office of these men to fear for the well-being of the corporation

just as an individual fears for his own well-being, and absent the privilege,
corporate agents would doubtless be reluctant to disclose facts which might
work against the corporation if disclosed. Indeed, the privilege may fulfill its
function more effectively when corporate officers are involved, since these officers are more likely than the average private litigant to know of its existence.
Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of
Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 241 (1961).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 559 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.
1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Herbert v. Lando, 73

F.R.D. 387, 400 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir.
1977); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D.
397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D.

Md. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 119 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd with-

out opinion, 478 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1973); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515, 520 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Power Co., 211
F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del. 1962).
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munications will be subject to disclosure, he lacks the necessary facts with which to advise the decision makers who are
protected.48 Rather than encouraging informed legal counsel,
the application of the privilege in this fashion seems to have
exactly the opposite effect. In addition, it ignores that in today's corporation many decisions are made by middle-level
managers whose recommendations are simply reviewed by the
top corporate officers.49
It is also argued that the control group test fails to ensure
predictability. 50 If a corporation is unsure who the court will
classify as a decision maker on a particular issue, it will be
unable to predict in advance to whom the privilege will extend. Without such assurance, the privilege can hardly fulfill
its purpose of eliminating apprehensions of disclosure.
Despite these criticisms, the test formulated by the Westinghouse court achieved sufficient following to be included in
the first draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence in 1969.51
Before the rule was adopted by Congress, however, a far more
liberal "subject matter" test was announced in Harper& Row
-Publishersv. Decker.5 2 Thereafter, the rule embodying the attorney-client privilege formulation was dropped from the
rules and further development in this area was left to case
53

law.

48. See, e.g., Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B.J.
542, 547 (1968); Note, supra note 31, at 374; Weinschel, CorporateEmployee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 873, 876

(1971).
49. Note, supra note 31, at 373; Weinschel, supra note 48, at 876.
50. See, e.g., Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (control group includes only division and corporate
vice-presidents, and not two directors of research and vice-president for production
and research); Kobak, supra note 13, at 368; Note, supra note 31, at 373. But see
Note, supra note 12, at 430-31.
51. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, PROPOSED FED. R. EVID., art. V, rule 5-03 (1969),
reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 249-50 (1969).
52. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afl'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971).
53. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the

common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
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B.

The Subject Matter Test

The first federal court to steer a middle course between
unlimited extension of the privilege in United Shoe and the
narrow approach of Westinghouse was Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker. 4 Petitioners sought mandamus to vacate a
lower court's order that Harper & Row produce debriefing
memoranda prepared by its attorneys after a number of its
lower echelon employees had testified before a grand jury in
an antitrust matter. Finding that the control group test, employed by the district court to deny the attorney-client privilege, was "not wholly adequate, 55 the court of appeals formulated its own test. It held that an employee's communications
were privileged if made at the direction of his superiors and if
the communications concerned matters within the scope of
the employee's duties.5 6 The court was careful to point out,
however, that the case did not deal "with the communications
of employees about matters as to which they are virtually indistinguishable from bystander witnesses.

' 57

The court thus

avoided any conflict with the Hickman dictum.
The primary advantage of the Harper approach is that it
recognizes the reality of the corporate structure. There are
bound to be employees who possess information which is vital
to effective legal counsel yet who lack decision making authority. There are others with the authority to direct the corporation's activity on a legal matter who do not independently
possess all the necessary information. In order to truly encourage the seeking of legal advice, both sides of this communication process must be protected. In addition, it is possible
that, lacking such protection, corporations might be reluctant
to undertake internal investigations fearing that information
collected would simply ease the burden for the opposing litithe light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
54. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971). One state court had adopted such a modified approach in D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964).
55. 423 F.2d at 491.
56. Id. at 491-92.
57. Id. at 491.
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gant.55 Therefore, the liberal Harper test actually encourages
compliance with the law and advances the interests of justice
and thus comports with the underlying purpose of the privilege. The subject matter test also seems to lend itself to a
greater degree of predictability than the control group test
and thus further encourages full disclosure.
On the negative side, the Harper test revives the fear originally expressed by Judge Campbell in Radiant Burners P9
that such a broad application of the privilege would create too
large a "zone of silence." While it may encourage internal investigations by the corporate counsel, it may also make the
burden of discovery on the opposing litigant almost insurmountable: The question then becomes whether the wide
availability of the privilege is truly serving the ends of justice.
Clearly, they are not served if the privilege is abused and documents are simply funneled through the attorney to make
them immune from discovery. A second criticism that can be
leveled at the subject matter test is that the availability of the
privilege does not motivate employees outside the control
group to communicate candidly with the attorney. Their motivation to communicate candidly is more likely to be fear of
disciplinary action if they fail to do so. And if the lower level
employee's conduct is an infraction of company policy or the
law, the privilege provides him with little assurance that his
communication will go no further than the corporate attorney.
Indeed, it could even be revealed outside the corporation if
the corporation chose to waive the privilege which it alone
holds.6 0
It appeared that the controversy between the two divergent schools of thought would be resolved when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the Harper decision. But
the affirmance of the case without opinion, by an equally divided Court,6 ' was without precedential effect. Therefore, the
circuits were still free to espouse either the Westinghouse or

58. Note, supra note 12, at 431. Even if the privilege is broadly applied, privileged
communications may be subject to disclosure in a shareholder's derivative suit. See
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
59. 207 F. Supp. at 774.
60. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979).
61. Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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the Harper approach.
Thereafter, the Eighth Circuit formulated what has been
called a "modified subject matter" test in Diversified Industries v. Meredith.62 Weatherhead, a corporation that had done
business with Diversified, sued alleging that Diversified employees had bribed Weatherhead purchasing agents to accept
inferior grades of copper. Weatherhead sought discovery of
memoranda prepared by an outside law firm which had been
retained by Diversified to conduct an investigation of its employees' conduct.6 3 In holding the memoranda to be privileged, the court'rejected the predominant control group test."
It praised the subject matter test for encouraging the free flow
of information by "focusing upon why an attorney was consulted, rather than with whom the attorney communicated." 65
But because it recognized the very real potential for abuse
which existed under the Harper test, the court adopted instead a five-part modification which had been suggested by
Judge Weinstein: 6
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the
purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making
the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of
the communication is within the scope of the employee's
corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. 7
After noting that the corporation bears the burden of demonstrating that all the elements of the test have been met, the
court summarily concluded that Diversified had met its burden and that the documents were privileged. 8
The Diversified test maintains the greatest advantage of
the Harper test: promoting the fullest possible disclosure by
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978)(en banc).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 609.
Id.
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 31, at 45-49.
572 F.2d at 609.
Id. at 610.
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protecting both information givers and decision makers, while
guarding against its shortcomings. Elements (1) and (3) guarantee that routine reports or communications necessary for
purely business reasons cannot be protected by funneling
them through the hands of the attorney. Element (5) provides
an elucidation of the traditional confidentiality requirement,6 9
which is particularly well suited to the corporate client. While
the individual employee knows that his disclosures may not
stop with the corporate attorney, he is also assured that the
information will not be carelessly disseminated throughout
the corporation.7 0 Therefore, a certain element of predictability on the confidentiality issue is introduced which was lacking in the Harpertest; arguably, this advances the purpose of
the privilege - to eliminate client apprehension about disclosure. As with the Harper test, element (4) precludes application of the privilege to a fortuitous witness and so avoids conflict with the Hickman dictum. Element (2) restates the
Harper requirement that the communication be at the direction of a corporate superior. Some confusion may arise regarding the definition of "superior. 7 1 Judge Weinstein's treatise,
upon which the Diversified court relied for the formulation of
its test, defines a superior as "one who is in a position to initiate a request for legal advice and whose actions indicate that
his purpose in directing disclosure to the attorney was in con7' 2
templation of the rendition of legal services.
While the subject matter variations of Harper and Diversified attempted to answer the criticisms of the control group
approach, other circuits remained unconvinced. Both the
Third and the Sixth Circuits rejected the subject matter approach even after its suggested modification in Diversified.

69. See supra text accompanying note 18.
70. See supra text accompanying note 44.
71. See Note, Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations:New
Directions and a Proposed Solution, 20 B.C. L. REV. 953, 965 (1979); 11 CONN. L.
REV. 94, 103 (1978).
72. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 31, at 48-49. This section continues,
At times, depending upon the structure of the corporation and the nature of
the communication, a communication which a rather low level employee made
on his own initiative may be privileged if the court can find that the employee
consciously divulged his information for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
which would benefit the corporation.
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C. The Third Circuit Reaffirmation of the Control Group
Test
In In re Grand Jury Investigation,"' the Third Circuit
adopted the control group test which had been formulated in
Westinghouse. A grand jury subpoenaed certain questionnaires and memoranda which had been prepared by a law firm
retained by the corporation to investigate questionable foreign
payments. After holding that some of the documents were not
protected by work-product immunity, the court of appeals addressed the question of attorney-client privilege and resolved
it against the corporation.
Noting as generally accepted principles that the privilege
should be narrowly construed and that application should be
predictable, the court stated that the control group test met
these basic criteria.7 4 The court then asserted that the communications protected by that narrow standard were the minimum which it was "socially desirable to protect."7 5 Any extension beyond that minimum "should depend upon whether
a broader rule would serve the policy of full communication.

7' 6

The court then turned to an examination of the arguments
urged for such an extension. First, the court rejected the
claim that the existence of the privilege encourages lower echelon employees to be candid with the corporate attorney. The
employee with nothing to hide has no reason to disregard his
superior's directives. The employee who faces personal civil or
criminal liability is afforded only illusory protection since the
privilege belongs to the corporation and it is only the corporation which can assert or waive it." Concluding that the exten-

sion of the privilege would have no effect on inducing lower
level employees to full disclosure, the inquiry turned to
whether lack of the privilege would inhibit counsel in the
search for relevant information on a particular matter. The
court pointed out that the information gathered in anticipation of litigation would in all likelihood be protected by the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
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Hickman work-product doctrine. And if there is not likely to
be litigation, privilege or lack of it has no significance."8 The
court also responded to commentators7 9 who had suggested
that corporations will be discouraged from undertaking internal investigations into possible wrongdoing if the privilege
does not extend to lower echelon employees. The court's answer was that corporations have no choice but to police themselves in view of the penalties that can be imposed for failure
to comply with the laws governing corporate activity.80 The
court concluded that the "control-group test is both broad
enough and flexible enough to accommodate the needs of a
corporate client."8 1L
With the Third Circuit's strong opinion in Grand Jury and
the Sixth Circuit's similar result in United States v. Upjohn
Co. 8 2 just a few weeks later, it became clear that the circuits
were not likely to fall in line behind the proposed subject
matter tests of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. Thus, the
matter was ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court.

III.

THE

Upjohn

DECISION

A. The Factual Setting
Upjohn manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals in the
United States and 136 foreign countries.8 3 An audit of one of
its foreign subsidiaries revealed possible illegal payments to
78. Id. at 1236-37.
79. See, e.g., Brodsky, "Zone of Darkness": Special Counsel Investigations and
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 123, 136-37 (1980).
80. 599 F.2d at 1237.
81. Id.
82. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
83. This summary relies on the Supreme Court opinion's statement of the facts
which is more detailed than that provided by the court of appeals. Not surprisingly,
in view of the opposite holdings, there are some differences in emphasis. For example,
the Supreme Court opinion specifies that the questionnaires were sent to "all foreign
general and area managers" while the court of appeals simply says that "officers and
employees" were questioned. The Supreme Court also notes that responses to the
questionnaire were to be sent directly to the General Counsel while the lower court
omits this except perhaps by implication. The court of appeals also states that of
$4,400,000 in questionable payments, Upjohn provided the IRS with detailed information on only $700,000 of this amount and with less detailed information on the
remainder. The Supreme Court opinion omits the figures entirely. And while the Supreme Court opinion points out that Upjohn provided the IRS with a list of the employees who received questionnaires and were interviewed, it does not mention, as
does the court of appeals, that the company. refused to permit the employees to be
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foreign government officials. When informed, the General
Counsel consulted with outside counsel and the Chairman of
the Board. They decided that the General Counsel, along with
outside counsel, would undertake an internal investigation. A
detailed questionnaire was sent to "all foreign general and
area managers" along with a letter from the Chairman of the
Board indicating that illegal activity might be involved and
that all responses should be sent directly to the General
Counsel. The Chairman's letter urged the managers to be candid, to treat the investigation as highly confidential and "not
to discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who
might be helpful in providing the requested information."'"
General and outside counsel also interviewed other officers
and employees and made notes and memoranda describing
these interviews.8"
The company filed a report with the SEC disclosing some
of the questionable payments. The report was also made
available to the IRS which immediately began an investigation of possible tax implications. The IRS issued a summons
for the "'written questionnaires sent to managers of the
Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates, and memoranda or notes
of the interviews conducted in the United States and abroad
with officers and employees ..

"86

'.

The company declined

to produce the documents, claiming work-product immunity
and attorney-client privilege. It did, however, provide the IRS
with a list of all persons who had been interviewed or had
responded to questionnaires." Upon the finding of a magistrate that the privilege had been waived, the District Court
for the Western District of Michigan ordered the summons
enforced under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). Upjohn
appealed."'
questioned about $3,700,000 of the $4,400,000 in questionable payments. 600 F.2d
1224-25 and 449 U.S. at 386-89.
84. 449 U.S. at 387.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 387-88.
87. The attorney-client privilege does not shield the names of employees who may

have relevant information from discovery. See United States v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980).

88. 449 U.S. at 3.88.
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B. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Sixth Circuit began its consideration of the Upjohn
case by noting two principles which underlie the attorney-client privilege when applied to natural persons - fostering loyalty89 and encouraging full disclosure.90 But like other
courts,91 the Sixth Circuit had conceptual difficulty in applying such principles to the inanimate corporation.2 Noting how
compartmentalized corporate employees and their functions
tended to be, the court concluded that "[iut is only the senior
management, guiding and integrating the several operations,
which can be said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole."93 It therefore adopted the control group
test.
In rejecting the subject matter approach, the court advanced two arguments. First, the court mentioned that broad
application of the privilege to cover the communications of
lower level employees encourages "purposeful ignorance" on
the part of senior managers.9 4 That is, once management becomes dimly aware of misconduct, it can simply instruct employees to give full information to the corporate attorney who
then becomes the "exclusive repository of unpleasant facts.

'9 5

The court said that such abdication of responsibility by upper
management (acting upon the attorney's advice without a detailed understanding of the underlying facts) would be detrimental both to the stockholders and to the interests of moral
corporate conduct.98 Second, the court said this scenario
would impose an undue burden on discovery.9 7 The attorney
would be the only person with all the facts, and the facts
would be protected from disclosure by the privilege. With top
management largely ignorant of the relevant information, an
89. 600 F.2d at 1225 (citing the passage from Dean McCormick quoted supra at
note 11).
90. Id. at 1226.
91. See supra note 47.
92. 600 F.2d at 1226.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1227.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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opposing litigant could be forced to interview large numbers
of employees in widely scattered locations.
While there can be little question that the subject matter
test places a greater burden on discovery than the control
group test does, the court's vision of the corporate attorney as
the exclusive repository of unpleasant facts may be inaccurate, at least under the modified subject matter approach. According to the Diversified test, a lower level employee's communication would remain privileged as long as it was not
disseminated beyond those in the corporation with a need to
know itY5 It seems clear that if the attorney revealed this information to a member of top management, this communication would likewise be privileged. Therefore, there would be
no reason for senior managers to ignore unpleasant facts.
The soundness of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, however,
was destined to become a moot point. The court of appeals
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
any of the communications in question had been made by
control group members. 9 But before this determination could
be made, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the attorney-client privilege question and the applicability of
the work-product doctrine in proceedings to enforce tax
summonses.10 0
C. The Supreme Court Decision
While the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v.
United States0 1 is clearly a defeat for proponents of the control group test, it is not necessarily a complete victory for adherents of the subject matter test. It appears instead to recog98. See supra text accompanying note 67.
99. 600 F.2d at 1227-28.
100. 449 U.S. at 386. The work-product issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. The court of appeals had disposed of Upjohn's argument on this question by
stating in a footnote that the work-product doctrine is not applicable to administrative summonses. 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13. The Supreme Court reversed on this point,
finding that tax summonses are subject to the doctrine. It further held that workproduct revealing an attorney's mental processes (such as the notes based on oral
statements of employees in this case) cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of
substantial need and inability to acquire the information without undue hardship.
Since the magistrate, on whose opinion the district court relied in finding that the
government had overcome the work-product rule, had applied "too lenient" a standard, the Court remanded this issue to the court of appeals. 449 U.S. at 397-402.
101. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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nize that only by rejecting rigid formulas in favor of case-bycase review can the application of the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate setting remain tied to its underlying
purposes. 10 2
Justice Rehnquist, writing for an eight-man majority, began the opinion by specifically declining to adopt a particular
"test," stating that it was the Court's function to decide only
the case before it. 1°3 After a review of case law pronouncements on the purpose of the privilege,104 the Court marshalled
a series of arguments which demonstrated the weaknesses of
the control group test. First, the Court took issue with the
court of appeals' conclusion (which is drawn directly from
Westinghouse) that the privilege should extend only to members of the control group because only these individuals can
be said to "personify" the corporation. 10 5 Anticipating the
information giver/decision maker dichotomy, the Supreme
Court responded, "Such a view . . . overlooks the fact that
the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice." ' 6 Standing alone, this statement implies
that if an individual can provide relevant information to the
attorney, he necessarily personifies the client and his communications are privileged. Clearly this would be an erroneous
basis on which to find that a personal attorney-client relationship had been established. The Court, however, held that it
was a proper basis on which to find an attorney-client relationship (that is, a privileged relationship) in the corporate
setting. After pointing out that lower and middle level employees often possess information that is vital to the attorney
in providing informed advice and that these employees can
embroil the corporation in legal difficulties, the Court summarily concluded that the control group test "frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of

102. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:Fixed Rules, Balancing, and
ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91 HARv. L. REV. 464 (1977); Kobak, supra note 13, at
362-74.
103. 449 U.S. at 386.
104. Id. at 389-90.
105. Id. at 390.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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relevant information by employees of the client. . . .,,o The
Court simply assumed that lower level employees would be
inhibited by lack of the privilege. It made no response to the
numerous critics who argue that the privilege is illusory as far
as the individual employee is concerned and that his primary
motivation is the order from his supervisor to speak with the
attorney. 10
The Court next pointed out that it is often noncontrol
group members who actually need and act on the legal advice
that the control group has sanctioned. 109 The Court argued
that, under the control group test, the attorney is inhibited
from giving full and frank legal advice to middle managers.
Since no attorney-client relationship exists, providing legal
advice to a middle manager may conflict with the interests of
the corporate client. In addition, the disclosure of a privileged
communication from a member of the control group to a middle manager would act as a waiver of the privilege.
Having examined the problems the control group test
presents for dealing with specific legal issues, the Court asserted that such a narrow application of the privilege also
"threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to
ensure their client's compliance with the law."11 0 Citing the
complexity of legislation regulating corporate activity, the
Court implied that without a privilege extending to employees
outside the control group, corporations would.be less willing
to police themselves. On this point, the Court did respond to
critics who argue that stiff penalties for regulatory violations
are sufficient incentive for self-examination. In a footnote, the
Court answered that the "depth and quality" of such examinations were likely to suffer in the absence of the privilege.1 '
Drawing an analogy between the corporate and personal privileges, the Court pointed out that an individual also has incen-

107. Id. at 392.
108. See supra note 13 and text accompanying notes 13, 43-45 and 76.
109. 449 U.S. at 392. The Court cites Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D. S.C. 1974) for this proposition. Duplan proposed a hybrid
control group/subject matter test. It required that (1) the corporation must speak
through a control group member and (2) the communication must be incident to a
request for legal advice. 397 F. Supp. at 1163-65.

110. 449 U.S. at 392.
111. Id. at 393 n.2.
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tives to disclose information to his lawyer but the law has
recognized the advantage of further facilitating these communications by extending the privilege.11 2
The Court's final reason for rejecting the control group
test was the uncertainty of its results. "An uncertain privilege,
or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all."1 3 A privilege can hardly dispel apprehensions about
disclosure if the client does not know in advance whether it
will attach. As case law has demonstrated and commentators
have pointed out,11 4 determining who is a member of a control
group on any particular matter is an imprecise science at best.
The parties' briefs illustrate that the argument is difficult to
refute. The petitioner levels the charge of unpredictability
and uncertainty against the control group test" 5 and the respondent's brief makes no reply. But while unpredictability is
one of the reasons the Court rejected the narrow test, its own
final decision to leave development of this area to future case
law contains at least a modicum of uncertainty.
After leveling its arguments at the control group test, the
Court proceeded to examine the facts of the case for a determination of whether the privilege should apply. Although the
Court purported not to adopt a particular "test" for the determination of this issue, 1 8 the facts are presented in such a way
that it is clear that the elements of the five-part modified subject matter test of Diversified 7 have been met. "The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel
for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel." 1 8 This first
sentence demonstrates that elements (1), (2) and (3) have

112. Id.
113. Id. at 393.
114. See supra note 50.
115. Brief for Petitioner at 40-44, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
116. 449 U.S. at 386.
117. See supra text accompanying note 67.
118. 449 U.S. at 394 (footnote omitted). In a footnote to this sentence, the Court
declined to decide the issue of whether the interviews which Upjohn had conducted
with former employees would be privileged because the lower courts had not addressed the issue. Id. at 394 n.3. The test which Chief Justice Burger proposes in his
concurrence would extend the privilege to former employees. Id. at 403.
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been met; the employee acted at the direction of his superior
and the communication was made for the purpose of securing
legal (not business) advice. The legal nature of the advice and
the fact that the communicating employees were fully informed of this fact was stressed repeatedly by the Court.11'
Next, the Court stated that "[t]he communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate
duties .... ",120 This statement satisfies element (4) of the
Diversified test: the subject matter of the communication was
within the scope of the employees' duties. The employees
were not, therefore, mere bystander witnesses, and so no conflict with the Hickman dictum arises.
Finally, the Court pointed out that "[p]ursuant to explicit
instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the communications were considered 'highly confidential' when made, . . .
and have been kept confidential by the company.

'121

The

Court adds in a footnote that the magistrate's opinion found
that the questionnaires and the notes of the interviews had
not been disclosed to anyone except the General Counsel and
outside counsel. 22 Clearly, element (5) of the Diversified test,
that the communication not be disseminated beyond those in
the corporation with a need to know, had been met. The footnote comment, in fact, raises the question of whether the
Court set a more stringent standard for confidentiality than
Diversified did; that is, strictly between the communicating
employee and attorney rather than among employee, attorney
119. As the magistrate found,
"Mr. Thomas consulted with the Chairman of the Board and outside counsel
and thereafter conducted a factual investigation to determine the nature and
extent of the questionable payments and to be in a position to give legal advice
to the company with respect to the payments.". . . Information, not available
from upper-echelon management, was needed to supply a basis for legal advice
concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas ....
[T]he employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were
being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. ...
A statement of policy accompanying the questionnaire clearly indicated the
legal implications of the investigation ....
This statement was issued to
Upjohn employees worldwide, so that even those interviewees not receiving a
questionnaire were aware of the legal implications of the interviews.
449 U.S. at 394-95.
120. Id. at 394.
121. Id. at 395.
122. Id. at 395 n.5.
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and those within the corporation with a need to know. While
this interpretation is possible, it seems unlikely in view of the
Court's movement away from the narrow control group test to
something much broader. It would be a contradiction to extend the privilege to a greater number of employees in hopes
of achieving fuller disclosure and then to keep the information
from senior managers who mQst need it to plan their legal
course. In sum, while the Court never referred explicitly to the
Diversified test, it seems to have used it as a guide when it
evaluated the facts before it and held the communications to
be privileged.
Before concluding its coverage of the attorney-client privilege issue, the Court responded to the most serious indictment
of the subject matter approach - that it creates too broad a
zone of silence over corporate affairs. 123 The Court maintained
that this criticism was baseless because it is only the communication between attorney and client that is protected from
disclosure, not the underlying information possessed by the
client. 124 The government was still free to depose the employees who responded to the questionnaires or interviews. Mere
convenience to the opposing litigants cannot "overcome the
policies served by the attorney-client privilege." 2 The Court
apparently rejected the contention that as time passes it becomes more difficult for employees to recall detailed information and easier for them to understand what should not be
revealed. 2 '
Justice Rehnquist concluded by reiterating his opening
statement that the Court was not adopting a particular test
with this opinion. 2 7 Rather, in conformity with Federal Rule
of Evidence 501,128 development in the area of privileges must
be on a case-by-case basis.
While such a "case-by-case" basis may to some slight extent
undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules. At
the same time we conclude that the narrow "control group
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Note, supra note 12, at 427.
449 U.S. at 396.
See supra note 53.
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test". . . cannot.
this area.12 9

. .

govern the development of the law in

Although Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result and
agreed with the majority's rejection of the control group test,
he wrote a concurrence proposing a fixed iest because he felt
such a standard was vital to insure predictability. 130 Unfortunately, his purposes might have been better served if he had
made the Court's holding unanimous in supporting, at least
by implication, the familiar elements of the Diversified test.
By proposing yet another formula, he introduced more uncertainty than he dispelled. For example, he proposed to include
former employees under the privilege, 31 1 while the majority
declined to address this issue."12 His formulation requires that
the employee speak and the attorney inquire at the direction
of "management."'3 3 Does "management" have a different
meaning than does "superior"? Does his formulation reintroduce the notion of a control group? And finally, the test enumerates three, but admittedly not all, situations in which a
communication would be for legal purposes and therefore protected.134 But do these specifications really relieve the burden
of the trial court judge in assessing in a particular situation
whether the communication was for a business or a legal purpose? It is not likely. By proposing the test, while the majority specifically declined to adopt the one on which it apparently relies, the Chief Justice appears only to have given the
circuit courts more fodder for diversity.
129. 449 U.S. at 396-97.
130. He proposed the following test:
[A] communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former
employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and
must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or
would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that
conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have
been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id. at 403.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 118.
133. 449 U.S. at 403.
134. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Upjohn Co. v. United States answers the question of who
speaks for the corporation. It is not only members of a control
group but it is also any employee who communicates concerning matters withi the scope of his duties at the direction of a
superior in order to secure legal advice from counsel. 135 While
the Court specifically declined to lay this down as a fixed rule,
it can hardly be doubted that this formulation points the way
for federal courts in the future. Implicit in this holding is that
the privilege is being extended to encourage the corporation
as an entity to seek legal counsel. The existence of the privilege may not be a motivating factor for an individual employee, but it can clearly be a strong motivation for the decision making arm of the corporation. Assured of such
protection, a corporation is more likely to seek assistance of
counsel in efforts to comply with regulatory legislation and to
conduct internal investigations. The Court clearly weighed
such interests of justice against the impediments to opposing
litigants and found the scales tipped in favor of the former.
Just as the Court gave the lower federal courts a clear outline to follow in determining who speaks for the corporation,
it also provided signposts for the determination of whether a
communication is for legal purposes. The specificity in the
Court's statement of facts and in the body of its opinion on all
the ways in which Upjohn informed its employees of the legal
nature of their communications"3 6 suggests that courts may
require a high degree of documentation in the future. The
Court's outline may cause attorneys to reconsider the common
practice of sitting on boards of directors and assuming that
many of their communications will be privileged. Upjohn establishes a high standard for demonstrating the legal nature
of communications.
One area of ambiguity in the opinion which could present
problems for future courts is the matter of confidentiality. Although the Court followed four of the elements of the Diversified test quite closely, it made no reference to tht fact that
confidentiality may be maintained even if information is disseminated beyond the attorney to those in the corporation
135. Id. at 394-95.
136. See supra note 119.
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with a need to know.137 Therefore, a stricter standard could be
imposed by lower courts and still be consistent with the
Upjohn opinion. This hardly seems a likely development,
however, in view of the liberal trend in application which
Upjohn adopts.
Finally, on the question of predictability, the Court made
progress despite the suggestion of the Chief -Justice's concurrence. The corporation which may be subject to suit in a number of geographic areas will no longer be confronted with the
sharp difference in standards between the control group and
the subject matter jurisdictions. 38 While the Court adopted
no fixed rule, it did set forth guidelines by implication which
closely resemble those in Diversified. These guidelines give
both corporations and courts a reasonably clear idea of which
communications will be privileged. But in spite of this degree
of, certainty, the Upjohn decision does not totally foreclose a
lower court from weighing, on a case-by-case basis, the social
benefits of protecting a particular communication against the
burdens placed upon discovery. In view of the Supreme
Court's broad application of the privilege, however, it is unlikely that a lower court will find the benefits of the privilege
outweighed.
KATHLEEN A. GRAY
THOMAS G. KREUL

137. See supra text accompanying notes 121 and 122.
138. The subject matter approach seems to be the prevailing rule in state courts
as well. See, e.g., In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948).
In the federal courts, state rules of privilege apply in diversity cases. Federal rules
generally apply in federal question cases but there are exceptions. See FED. R. EviD.
501, supra note 53; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 31, at 501[01].

